1. (Evolutionary games) Consider the game below. H I H (5,5) I (2,2) Fill in the missing payoffs to create the following situations: (a) (H,H) is a single, evolutionarily stable equilibrium (when only monomorphic pure strategies are allowed) (b) (I,I) is a single, evolutionarily stable equilibrium (when only monomorphic pure strategies are allowed) (c) There is a a single evolutionarily stable mixed strategy that places probabilities greater than 0 on both H and I (when allowing for mixed strategies/polymorphic pure strategies) (d) There are exactly two evolutionarily stable strategies (pure or mixed).

'1 1. [Evolutionary games) Consider the game below. l K (2:2) Fill in the missing payolfs to create the following situations: (a) (11,11) is a single, evolutionarily stable equilibrium [when only monomorphie pure strategies are allowed) (b) (Ll) is a single: evolutionarily stable equilibrium (when only n1onon1orphir: pure strategies are allowed) (0) There is a a single evolutionarily stable mixed strategy that. places probabilities greater than 0 011 both 1-1 and 1 (when allowing for mixed strategies/polymorphic pure strategies) ((1) There are exactly two evolutionarily stable strategies (pure or mixed)