1. (Evolutionary games) Consider the game below. H I H (5,5) I (2,2) Fill in the missing payoffs to create the following situations: (a) (H,H) is a single, evolutionarily stable equilibrium (when only monomorphic pure strategies are allowed) (b) (I,I) is a single, evolutionarily stable equilibrium (when only monomorphic pure strategies are allowed) (c) There is a a single evolutionarily stable mixed strategy that places probabilities greater than 0 on both H and I (when allowing for mixed strategies/polymorphic pure strategies) (d) There are exactly two evolutionarily stable strategies (pure or mixed).

1. (Evolutionary games) Consider the game below. H H (5, 5) (2, 2) Fill in the missing payoffs to create the following situations: (a) (H,H) is a single, evolutionarily stable equilibrium (when only monomorphic pure strategies are allowed) (b) (1,I) is a single, evolutionarily stable equilibrium (when only monomorphic pure strategies are allowed) (c) There is a a single evolutionarily stable mixed strategy that places probabilities greater than 0 on both H and I (when allowing for mixed strategies/ polymorphic pure strategies) (d) There are exactly two evolutionarily stable strategies (pure or mixed)