1. Exercise 30.1 (Variants of the Stag Hunt) Consider variants of the n-hunter Stag Hunt. That...

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1. Exercise 30.1 (Variants of the Stag Hunt) Consider variants of the n-hunter Stag Hunt. That is, there are n number of hunters. Only m hunters, with 2 m 2. Extension of the Stag Hunt There are n hunters and each hunter is given K (a positive integer) units of effort, which she can exert in pursuing the stag. Denote the effort hunter i devotes to pursuing the stag by ei, a nonnegative integer equal to at most K. That is, the set of effort levels hunter i is 0, 1, 2, ..., K, where K 2. The chance that the stag is caught depends on the smallest of all the hunters' efforts. ("A weakest-link chain") Specifically, Hunter i's payoff to the action profile (e,e2, ...,en) is given as follows: 2 min {e,e, 3, ..., en} - C. Find the Nash equilibria of the strategic game that models the situation. 3. Exercise 33.1 (Contributing to a public good) Each of n people chooses whether to contribute a fixed amount toward the provision of a public good. The good is provided if and only if at least k people contribute, where 2 k 1. Exercise 30.1 (Variants of the Stag Hunt) Consider variants of the n-hunter Stag Hunt. That is, there are n number of hunters. Only m hunters, with 2 m 2. Extension of the Stag Hunt There are n hunters and each hunter is given K (a positive integer) units of effort, which she can exert in pursuing the stag. Denote the effort hunter i devotes to pursuing the stag by ei, a nonnegative integer equal to at most K. That is, the set of effort levels hunter i is 0, 1, 2, ..., K, where K 2. The chance that the stag is caught depends on the smallest of all the hunters' efforts. ("A weakest-link chain") Specifically, Hunter i's payoff to the action profile (e,e2, ...,en) is given as follows: 2 min {e,e, 3, ..., en} - C. Find the Nash equilibria of the strategic game that models the situation. 3. Exercise 33.1 (Contributing to a public good) Each of n people chooses whether to contribute a fixed amount toward the provision of a public good. The good is provided if and only if at least k people contribute, where 2 k

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I can help you analyze the Nash equilibria in the problems you described 1 Exercise 301 Variants of the Stag Hunt a Fraction 1n preferred to hare Here the Nash equilibria depend on the value of m numb... View the full answer