1. (Simultaneous Game.) Paul and Susie each pick an integer between one and five (inclusive). They make their choices simultaneously. If they pick the same number, dis each receives a payoff (in dollars) equal to the number they named. If they pick dist Please do not different numbers, they receive nothing. Draw a table representing the game, show- ing the players' strategies and payoffs. Does either player have a dominant, weakly dominated, or dominated strategy? Identify all Nash equilibria. Are all equally plausible? Why or why not? Confide Please do not tribute Contentjal. Plea (Simultaneous Game.) Alice and Tiffany are playing a simple one-stage game. Each simultaneously chooses either 1 or 2. If they both choose 1, Alice pays Tiffany $1. If they both choose 2, Alice pays Tiffany $2. If they choose different numbers, Tiffany Plea ial. pays Alice $1. Are any strategies dominant, weakly dominated, or dominated? Indicate each player's best responses. Co ribute