1 Uncertain Termination ABCabc (25 points) Consider the following game that is played with uncertain termination. That is, after each round the game mntinues with probability 5 and ends with probability 1 Ii, whereupon each player gets a payoff of 0. Players move simultaneously and independently. Then each player is informed about the actions taken by the other player in the round and, given this, they play it again with probability 5. The payoff for the whole game is the expectation of the sum of the payoffs a player obtains. ~You may remember a version of this question from Lesson 3 where the game was played only twice. Note the payoff for {21,12} has changed. a b c A 3,2 5,1] 2,2 13 2,2 4,4 1,2 c 1,2 11,2 2,3 a} [5 points) Is it plllible for B and b to be played forever, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, even though {3, h} is not a Nash equilibrium in the payoff table above, if J = I]? b} [5 points] Dene a grim trigger strategy for this game. e} {5 points] Reconsider part a} if E a [1.9. d} {In points} What is the minimum value of Ii needed to sustain cooperation