11) Consider the following simultaneous move game between 2 creditors deciding whether to foreclose on a loan made to a country that is now considered a serious credit risk. Let the creditors be known as FM International (FMI) and MuniChase. FMI Foreclose Renegotiate Refrain Foreclose 0, 0 50. 5 50, 10 MuniChase Renegotiate 5, 50 35,35 40. 5 Refrain 10, 50 5, 40 25, 25 Which of the following statements about the above game is true? A) (Refrain, Refrain) is the Nash equilibrium because it is a prisoners' dilemma. B) {Renegotiate, Renegotiate) is a Nash equilibrium because it maximizes the total payoffs. C) (Foreclose, Refrain) is the unique Nash equilibrium because MuniChase threatened to always play Foreclose. D) { Refrain, Foreclose) is one of the Nash equilibria, but there may be others. E) There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium