18. Consider the following simultaneous move game between 3 creditors deciding whether to foreclose on a loan made to a country that is now considered a serious credit risk. Let the creditors be known as FM International (FMI), MuniChase (MC) and the Purification Bank (PB). Assume that PB chooses matrices and that their payoffs are listed third. The payoffs to each player are given as follows. PB Foreclose Refrain FMI FMI Foreclose Refrain Foreclose Refrain MC Foreclose 15, 20, 15 35, 15, 25 MC Foreclose 5, 15, 5 15, 10, 25 Refrain 5, 40, 25 35, 25, 35 Refrain 10, 30, 20 5, 5, 20 Which of the following statements about the above game is true? Remember that the payoffs and strategies are listed in the order: {MC, FMI, PB} A) There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, but there is one in mixed strategies. B) {Refrain, Refrain, Foreclose} is a Nash equilibrium because it maximizes the total payoffs. C) {Refrain, Foreclose, Foreclose} is a Nash equilibrium because FMI has a first-mover advantage. . D) { Foreclose, Foreclose, Foreclose) is the unique Nash equilibria. E) { Foreclose, Foreclose, Foreclose) and { Foreclose, Refrain, Refrain) are pure strategy Nash equilibria and there is also one in mixed strategies