Question: 1.4 Is there a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each player fights if and only if she is of type 1? If so, what is

1.4 Is there a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each player fights if and only if she is of type 1? If so, what is the equilibrium probability of a fight? 1.5 Assume that A never fights. If B is of type 1, what should she do? If she is of type 0, what should she do? 1.6 Is there a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which no player ever fights

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