Question: 1.Explain why sequential rationality is stronger than common knowledge of rationality. 2.Explain why subgame perfect equilibrium requires the assumption of equilibrium knowledge. 3.Two players will

1.Explain why sequential rationality is stronger than common knowledge of rationality.

2.Explain why subgame perfect equilibrium requires the assumption of equilibrium knowledge.

3.Two players will each be dealt one card from the same shuffled deck containing 1 ace and 4 queens. Each player only observes their own card. Model the situation by specifying a probability distribution on an appropriate set of type profiles and calculate each player's beliefs about the opponents' types conditioning on their own types.

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