2. Consider the following simultaneous move game: 1 (a) What is the unique Nash equilibrium of this game? (b) Suppose the game is repeatedly played an infinite number of times and the players maximize the present value of the stream of payoffs discounting future payoff with discount factor (0,1). For what range of values of is there a subgame perfect equilibrium where both players earn payoff (3,3) in every period? Outline the strategies underlying this equilibrium clearly. (c) How does your answer in (b) change if the game is repeated up to a finite number of times? Explain 2. Consider the following simultaneous move game: 1 (a) What is the unique Nash equilibrium of this game? (b) Suppose the game is repeatedly played an infinite number of times and the players maximize the present value of the stream of payoffs discounting future payoff with discount factor (0,1). For what range of values of is there a subgame perfect equilibrium where both players earn payoff (3,3) in every period? Outline the strategies underlying this equilibrium clearly. (c) How does your answer in (b) change if the game is repeated up to a finite number of times? Explain