2. Consider the following simultaneous move stage game. In each cell, player l's payoff is shown first. Player 2 L C R T 3,1 0,0 5,0 Player 1 M 2,1 1, 2 3,1 B 1, 0,1 4,4 This game is played twice, without discounting of the second stage payoffs. Both players observe the outcome of the first stage prior to making their second stage choices. Determine whether or not (4,4) can be the first stage payoffs from a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Explain your answer carefully. 2. Consider the following simultaneous move stage game. In each cell, player l's payoff is shown first. Player 2 L C R T 3,1 0,0 5,0 Player 1 M 2,1 1, 2 3,1 B 1, 0,1 4,4 This game is played twice, without discounting of the second stage payoffs. Both players observe the outcome of the first stage prior to making their second stage choices. Determine whether or not (4,4) can be the first stage payoffs from a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Explain your answer carefully