Question: 2.11. The simultaneous-move game (below) is played twice, with the outcome of the first stage observed before the second stage be- gins. There is no

 2.11. The simultaneous-move game (below) is played twice, with the outcome

2.11. The simultaneous-move game (below) is played twice, with the outcome of the first stage observed before the second stage be- gins. There is no discounting. Can the payoff (4, 4) be achieved in the first stage in a pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilib rium? If so, give strategies that do so. If not, prove why not. L C R T 3, 1 0, 0 5,0 M 2, 1 1,2 3, 1 B 1, 2 0, 1 4, 4

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