Question: 3. Consider this game in an extensive form (there are 2 players, A and B): A left right middle B B B gauche gauche gauche

3. Consider this game in an extensive form (there are 2 players, A and B): A left right middle B B B gauche gauche gauche milieu milieu milieu (2,3) (4, 2) (6, 6) (1, 9) (1, 9) (7, 7) (5, 3) a. Find the subgame-perfect equilibrium. (1) b. Explain why the players cannot reach the outcome with the payoffs circled in orange (which they both would prefer to the equilibrium outcome). (1)

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