5. Consider a game with incomplete information where there are two players, P1 and P2. There are two possible interactions that could occur between the players, type A and type B. . The interaction will by of type A with probability , and of type B with probability 3. . Player 1 knows the type, but player 2 does not. . Player 1 observes whether the interaction will be type A or type B and chooses to move either "Up" (U) or "Down" (D). If Player 1 chooses "Down", the game ends. . If Player 1 moves "Up", then Player 2 may move "Left" (L), or "Right" (R). Player 2 observes player 1's move, but does not observe the interaction type. . Refer to the extensive form game shown below, which includes the payoffs. Nature interaction type A interaction Type B prob = +. prob P1 P1 D D' P2 (-2, 1 ) (-2, 1) (4, 0) (-2,4) (-2,4) (4, 0) (a) Create a Bayesian Normal form game. (b) Identify any Bayesian Nash equilibria. No explanation is needed. It is enough to identify best responses in the Bayesian normal form game in the usual way and then use the information about best responses to identify any Bayesian Nash equilibria