4. Consider a market for consulting services where clients differ in the difficulty for consultants of carrying out the consulting job. In particular, there are three types of consulting jobs ranked by their difficulty and expected costs (T₁, T₂, and T₃) according to the table below. For example, a T₃ job is an "easy" job that generates value of 25 to the client and consultants incur a cost of 20 when performing it. Suppose that clients know the difficulty of the job, but consultants do not know it at the time at which they agree to accept the job.

Type	Firm (Client) Value	Consultant Expected Cost	Frequency
T3	25	20	1/3
T2	32	30	1/3
T1	65	40	1/3

a) Can there be a competitive market equilibrium allocation where all three types of clients/jobs (under the assumption of asymmetric information) are active in the market? In an equilibrium with asymmetric information, which type of clients will be active in the market hiring consultants?

b) Suppose that Type T₃ customers value consulting services at 31 rather than 25. Can there be a competitive market equilibrium allocation where all three types of clients/kobs (under the assumption of asymmetric information) are active in the market?

c) Suppose that consultants learn that all firms in a particular industry (say fashion) are type T3, and, moreover, type T₃ clients can only be found in the industry. As a result of this insight, can there be a competitive market equilibrium allocation where all three types of clients/jobs purchase consulting services?