please help with part a. if possible part b too

does it produce? Are to pr 4. Consider a market for consulting services where clients differ in the difficulty for consultants of carrying out the consulting job. In particular, there are three types of consulting jobs ranked by their difficulty and expected costs (T. T2. and Ta) according to the table below. For example, a Ta job is an easy job that generates value of 25 to the client and consultants incur cost of 20 when performing it. Suppose that clients know the difficulty of the job. but consultants do not know it at the time at which they agree to accept the job. Type Firm (Client) Consultant Frequency Value Expected Cost T3 25 20 1/3 T2 32 30 1/3 T1 65 40 1/3 a) Can there be a competitive market equilibrium allocation where all three types of clients/jobs (under the assumption of asymmetric information) are active in the market? In an equilibrium with asymmetric information, which type of clients will be active in the market hiring consultants? b) Suppose that Type Ta customers value consulting services at 31 rather than 25. Can there be a competitive market equilibrium allocation where all three types of clients/jobs (under the assumption of asymmetric information) are active in the market