Question: ( a ) Consider a first - price auction for a good. There are two bidders, whose value of the good is private, independent from

(a) Consider a first-price auction for a good. There are two bidders, whose value of the good is private, independent from uniform distribution [0,1] Please derive the equilibrium strategy and the expected sellers revenue.
(b) repeat it under second price auction.
(c) If the seller charges take-it-or-leave price, what is the sellers optimal price?

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