A husband and wife must simultaneously and independently choose whether to go to the opera or the football game. (They talked about going to either place last night, but none of them can remember which place they agreed to attend. To make matters worse, there has been a major phone and internet breakdown and cannot communicate before heading to either event.) The husband would prefer that both attend the football game, the wife prefers that both attend to the opera, but both would be better off attending each other's preferred event rather than being alone at their most preferred event. For instance, the husband obtains a payoff of 1 when attending the opera with his wife, but zero if he is at the football game, or at the opera, alone.

		Wife	Wife
		Football	Opera
Husband	Football	4,2	0,0
Husband	Opera	0,0	1,5

a. Show that there are no strictly dominated strategies for the husband or the wife.

b. Show that there are two NE in pure strategies and that your equilibrium results resemble those in coordination games.

c. Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game, where the Husband goes to the football game with probability p and the Wife with probability q.

Answer rating: 100% (QA)

a Show that there are no strictly dominated strategies for the husband or the wife A strictly domina... View the full answer