a worker costs 0 > 0. Let a: 6 [0,1] be the share of employees who use social media and let 3 E [0, 1] be the probability that a worker is monitored. a. Write down the matrix corresponding to the normal-form of this game. b. Assume that w > c and w > 5. How large should the share of workers who use social media in the work force be for random monitoring to be optimal? c. With what probability should a worker be monitored to be indifferent between using social media or not? Find the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Imagine now that the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies you just found is at play but that the government is concerned about the low productivity of the work force. In particular, the government wants to reduce the use of social media on the job and is choosing between relaxing the privacy laws so that monitoring is made easier (i.e., reduce c), or forcing the social media rms to make their sites more diicult to access during work time (i.e., reduce s). d. What should the government do? Explain