This first assignment is an experiment with an experiment. That is, I don't know how well...

 

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This first assignment is an experiment with an experiment. That is, I don't know how well it will work, but hopefully will illustrate the basics of the evolution of cooperation. You should each sign up for one of the groups on canvas. There will be four or five people in each group. Each person in the group should do the following steps. 1) Flip a coin. If you get heads, you will be a tit-for-tat player in the first round. If you get tails, you will be an all-0 player. Please flip the coin only once, and abide by the outcome so that your type will be truly random. Do not tell other people in the group which type you are, My coin toss resulted in The actions in the first rounds were (write C for cooperate, O for opportunism): 1 2 3 4 5 Payoff Me Other 1 Me - | Other 2 - Me Other 3 Me Other 4 Use the following normal form game to calculate the payoffs. The object is NOT to get the highest payoff, it is to faithfully play your type. II 12, 2) (3,-1) (-1, 3 ) (1,1) I m | lm I lm || I - |-I This first assignment is an experiment with an experiment. That is, I don't know how well it will work, but hopefully will illustrate the basics of the evolution of cooperation. You should each sign up for one of the groups on canvas. There will be four or five people in each group. Each person in the group should do the following steps. 1) Flip a coin. If you get heads, you will be a tit-for-tat player in the first round. If you get tails, you will be an all-0 player. Please flip the coin only once, and abide by the outcome so that your type will be truly random. Do not tell other people in the group which type you are, My coin toss resulted in The actions in the first rounds were (write C for cooperate, O for opportunism): 1 2 3 4 5 Payoff Me Other 1 Me - | Other 2 - Me Other 3 Me Other 4 Use the following normal form game to calculate the payoffs. The object is NOT to get the highest payoff, it is to faithfully play your type. II 12, 2) (3,-1) (-1, 3 ) (1,1) I m | lm I lm || I - |-I