Agents $1$ and $2$ plan to arrive at an event. They cannot communicate with each other and each

of them can arrive at any of the times in T$=\{0,1,2\}.$ If agent i in $\{1,2\}$arrives at ti in T and agent j $=$ i

arrives at tj in T $,$ then the payoff of agent i is

ui$($ti$,$ tj $)=$

$$

$2($ti$$tj $)2$ if ti $<$ tj

$($ti$$tj $)2$ otherwise

$($a$).$ Is there any strictly dominated strategy for agent $1?$ If yes, find it$.$ Otherwise, explain that there is no

strictly dominated strategy for agent $1.(3$ points$)$

$($b$).$ Is there a unique maxmin equilibrium? If yes, find it$.$ If not, find the set of all maxmin equilibria. $(5$

points$)$