An alternative vision of the problem of social cooperation is provided by the Stag Hunt game,...

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An alternative vision of the problem of social cooperation is provided by the Stag Hunt game, in which two hunters can cooperate in hunting a large deer or can each individually is bag a small hare. As Rousseau noted, the crux of the problem is that if two hunters have partnered to hunt a deer, one partner might be tempted to abandon the hunt to grab a passing hare for himself, leaving his companion in the lurch. The payoffs are as follows: Hunter B Hunter A Stag Hare 1,0 1,1 Stag Hare 3,3 0,1 What is the most-preferred outcome, and is there another outcome in which neither player has an incentive to alter his strategy (assuming the other player's strategy stays fixed)? Does either player end up doing better playing either Stag or Hare no matter what his partner chooses to do, as in the marsh-draining game? How certain must A be that B will be playing Stag to do the same? Explain how this game illustrates the role of trust in cooperation. An alternative vision of the problem of social cooperation is provided by the Stag Hunt game, in which two hunters can cooperate in hunting a large deer or can each individually is bag a small hare. As Rousseau noted, the crux of the problem is that if two hunters have partnered to hunt a deer, one partner might be tempted to abandon the hunt to grab a passing hare for himself, leaving his companion in the lurch. The payoffs are as follows: Hunter B Hunter A Stag Hare 1,0 1,1 Stag Hare 3,3 0,1 What is the most-preferred outcome, and is there another outcome in which neither player has an incentive to alter his strategy (assuming the other player's strategy stays fixed)? Does either player end up doing better playing either Stag or Hare no matter what his partner chooses to do, as in the marsh-draining game? How certain must A be that B will be playing Stag to do the same? Explain how this game illustrates the role of trust in cooperation.