answer it please

3. Consider the following normal-form game in which Player 1 has three actions: T, M, B; and Player 2 has three actions: L, C, R. Player 2 L C R T120|1,1]4,2 Player 1 M | 3,4 | 1,2 | 2,3 B|{1,30,2]3,0 (a) Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game. (b) Consider an alteration of the game. Action T is no longer available to Player 1, and Action L is no longer available to Player 2. (i) Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of this altered game. (ii) Now, further turn the altered game into a dynamic game, in which Player 1 moves first and Player 2 moves after observing Player 1's move. Draw the game tree of this game and find the sub-game perfect equilibrium. Should Player 1 attempt to obtain the highest payoff of 37 Why or why not