answer question 2 please

Question 1 (1 point) Consider an extensive game with 3 players. Player 1 moves first and chooses an action, A or B. Player 2 observes this and then chooses an action herself. Her actions are C or D, regardless of the past history. Finally, player 3 observes the actions of players 1 and 2 before making his own choice. His possible actions are E or F if player 1 chose A, regardless of what player 2 chose. If player 1 chose B and player 2 chose C, then player 3's possible actions are G or H. If player 1 chose B and player 2 chose D, then player 3's possible actions are | orJ. Draw the game tree (without payoffs). Which of the following is a strategy profile [strategies are discussed in the second recorded lecture]? Check all that apply. C] (A,D,F) is a strategy profile C] (A,D,EE) is a strategy profile C] (B,DD,FI) is a strategy profile C] None of the above. Question 2 (1 point) Consider the extensive game with 3 players from before. Assume that all players have the exact same payoff. This is determined primarily by the action chosen by player 3. Players are better off the later in the alphabet that player 3's action is. For instance, they are better off if player 3's action is H than F and better off if the action is F than E. If player 3's action is F, players are better off when player 2 pick D than C. The same is true if player 3's action is E. Use backwards induction to solve the game. Which of the following strategy profiles is the solution? C] (B,D,J) C] (B,DD,FFHJ) C] (B,CD,EFGJ) C] None of the above