Assume that there is a large population in which each members behavior is hardwired into them, so that each player is either a defector or a tit-for-tat player. (As described in the textbook, in multiple rounds of a prisoners dilemma, a tit-for-tat player cooperates on the first play. In subsequent rounds she does whatever her opponent did on the preceding play).

Let the population proportion of defectors be p and the proportion of tit-for-tat player be (1 p). Each member of the population plays sets of dilemmas n times (where n 2), matched against a new, randomly chosen opponent for each new set. The payoff to each player in one whole set (of n players) is the sum of her payoffs in the n plays.

(a) Show in a two-by-two table the payoffs to a player of each type when, in one set of plays, each player meets an opponent of each of the two types.

(b) Find the fitness (average payoff in one set against a randomly chosen opponent) for a defector.

(c) Find the fitness for a tit-for-tat player.

this is all information i was given, thank you so much if you can help

Question 6 Consider the following single-play version of a Prisoner's Dilemma game Player 2 T D T 1,5 Player 1 D 5,1 2,2 Question 6 Consider the following single-play version of a Prisoner's Dilemma game Player 2 T D T 1,5 Player 1 D 5,1 2,2