Hi, can you please help solve the question attached. Thank you!

Question Q. Consider the following single-play version of a Prisoner's Dilemma game Assume that there is a large population in which each member's behavior is hardwired into them, so that each player is either a defector or a tit-fortat player. (As described in the textbook, in multiple rounds of a prisoner's dilemma, a tit-fortat player cooperates on the rst play. In subsequent rounds she does whatever her opponent did on the preceding play). Let the population proportion of defectors be p and the proportion of tit-fortat player he (1 p). Each member of the population plays sets of dilemmas n times (where n 22), matched against a new, randomly chosen opponent for each new set. The payoff to each player in one whole set (of a players) is the sum of her payoffs in the :1 plays. (a) Show in a two-bytwo table the payoffs to a player of each type When, in one set of plays, each player meets an opponent of each of the two types. (13) Find the tness (average payoff in one set against a randomly chosen opponent) for a defector. (c) Find the tness for a tit-for-tat player. (d) Use the answers in part (b) and part (c) to show that, when p > (n 3/2)/ (H 1), the defector type has greater tness and that, when p