AutoSave . Off) Econ 301 - Spring 2019 - Blue Final (1) - Saved to this PC Search (Alt+Q) Vasili, Justin B VJ X File Home Insert Draw Design Layout References Mailings Review View Help Share Comments & Cut Calibri (Body) 11 ~ A" A Aa Ap Find Lol [ Copy AaBbCcDd AaBbCcDd AaBbC AaBbcc Aab AaBbCCD S'c Replace Paste BIU~ ab X x A LA 1 Normal 1 No Spac.. Heading 1 Heading 2 Title Subtitle Dictate Sensitivity Editor Reuse Format Painter Select Files Clipboard Font Paragraph Styles Editing Voice Sensitivity Editor Reuse Files Jack and Jill are playing a simultaneous game shown in normal form below, Jill must choose move A, B, or C as Jack chooses move X, Y, or Z._ Payoffs for each of the possible nine joint strategies are shown as (Jill's payoff, Jack's payoff). JACK Moves (100,75) (75,80 (85,85) JILL B (95,85 65,100 (80,70) (75,90 (60,90) (65,110) 15. If both players play a secure strategy, Jack's payoff will be: a) 75 6)80 C) 85 d)90 e) None of the above are correct. 16. We would expect the outcome of this game to be Jill plays move and Jack plays move a) B; Z b) A; Z c) C; Z d) B; X e) None of the above are correct. 17. has a potential "first mover" advantage in this game, and would be willing to pay up to for the right to make the first move. a) Jack; 5 b) Jill; 5 c) Jack; 10 d) Jill; 10 e) None of the above are correct. BLUE Final Exam Page 4 of 8 Econ 301 - Spring 2019 An employee works for a manager who can choose to monitor his efforts on the job or not to monitor. The manager realizes that he can choose to work or shirk while on the job:. If she is monitoring and he is working, her payoff s 20 and his payoff is 30... If she is monitoring and he is shirking, her payoff is 60 and his payoff is -30,. If she chooses not to monitor and he is working, her payoff is 40 and his payoff is 20. . If she is not monitoring and he is shirking, her Page 4 of 8 2234 words CX Focus + 90% Type here to search O 9 42.F ~ - 6 0 7) 10:24 AM 3 12/14/2021 E