B https://1... 6. [30 MARKS] There is a continuum of consumers distributed uniformly with density 1 over the interval [0, 1]. There are three stores: store A is located at 0, store B is located at 0.6, and store C is located at 1. There are three profit-maximising firms i = 1, 2, 3 that produce a homogeneous product at no cost. The timing of the game is as follows: . Firm 1 chooses its store among A, B, and C (i.e., it chooses among locations 0, 0.6 , and 1). . Firm 2 chooses its store among the two that firm 1 did not pick. . Firm 3 gets the last available store. . All three firms simultaneously choose their price. . Each consumer x E [0, 1] purchases one unit of the product from whichever store minimises the sum of the price and the travel distance. (For consumer x, that sum is pA t x if (s) he goes to store A, PB + x - 0.6) if she goes to store B, and po + 1 - x if she goes to store C.) Find where each firm locates itself and what price it sets in equilibrium