c. Solve the game by backward induction. Be careful to make sure that you are comparing the payoffs of the correct legislator. What is the expected outcome of the game? What are the payoffs that each player receives? What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? d. Imagine that you are one of the legislators again. Now that you have solved the game, would you prefer to vote first, second, or third? Explain your answer. Did your answer change from before? e. Does the Legislative Pay Raise Game have any implications for whether you would want to be in a position to set the rules or the agenda in business meetings or other official settings? Explain your answer. Payoffs Outcome Yes 3, 3, 3 Raise 3 Yes No 3, 3. 4 Raise 2 Yes 3, 4, 3 Raise Yes No 3 No 1, 2, 2 No Raise 1 Yes ? Raise No 3 Yes No No Raise 2 No Raise Yes No 3 No ? No Raise\f4. (10 pts) Consider the extensive form game below. (a) What are the subgame perfect equilibria of the game? P1 P2 P2 D P3 (3,4,1 ) (1,3,3) (1,2,1) (6,2,1) (6,0,1) (2, 3, 2)5. (15 pts.) Find the Nash equilibria of the games. [Note on best replies: If the best reply is not unique then all the actions that result in the highest payoff are best replies.] (a) Candidate 2 L R Candidate 1 U 0, 0 1, 1 D 1, 1 0, 0 (b) Candidate 2 L R Candidate 1 U 0,0 100, 100 D 1, 1 0,0 (c) Candidate 2 L R Candidate 1 U 1, 1 1, 1 D 1, 1 1, 1