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Suppose we have the followig payoff matrix for a complementary investment game. The number in the lower left corner is the payoff to Wild and Crazy Guys (Guys). The other number is the payoff to Blues Brothers (Blues Bros.). Is there a dominant strategy for either player? The dominant strategy for Blues Bros. l: and the dominant strategy for Guys : . What is the Nash equilibrium? O A. The Nash equilibrium is for Blues Bros. and Guys to not invest. O B. The Nash equilibria is for Blues Bros. and Guys to invest and for Blues Bros. and Guys to not invest. O c. The Nash equilibrium is for Blues Bros. to not invest and Guys to invest. O D. The Nash equilibrium is for Blues Bros. and Guys to invest. O E. This game has no Nash equilibria. What is the maximin solution? The maximin solution is for Blues Bros. to V and for Guys to :- Don't invest Guys Invest Don't invest Invest his AL 9,0 Would pre-play communication (cheap talk) or the Pareto criterion have implications for the repeated game equilibrium? The outcome where both restaurants do not advertise O A. can be achieved with the Pareto Criterion because the restaurants have different understandings of the situation. 0 B. can be achieved with the Pareto Criterion because not advertising becomes the dominant strategy. G) C. can be achieved with cheap talk or the Pareto Criterion because not advertising is credible when the game is repeated innitely. O D. can be achieved with cheap talk with binding agreements. O E. can be achieved with cheap talk by changing that outcome's payoffs