Suppose we have the followig payoff matrix for a complementary investment game. The number an the lower left corner is the payoff to Wiid and Crazy Guys (Guys). The other number is the payoffto Blues Brothers (Blues Bros ) is there a dominant strategy for either player? 1'1. 1 The dominant strategy for Blues Bros 5 and the dominant strategy for Guys What is the Nash equilibrium? 0 A. The Nash equilibrium is tor Blues Bros. and Guys to invest. O B. The Nash equilibrium is for Blues Bros to not invest and Guys to invest. O C. The Nash equilibrium is for Blues Bros to invest and Guys to not invest. O D. This game has no Nash eouilibria. O E. The Nash equilibrium is tor Blues Bros. and Guys to not invest. What Is the maxtmin solution?J The maximin solution is for Blues Bros to EV and for Guys to 17'". How would the reputation of Blues Bros. affect the likely outcome? 0 A. Guys could use a maximin strategy. 0 B. Guys could impose a penalty on Blues Bros If they do not invest. O (2. Guys could rely on Blues Bros's past behavror. O D. Guys and Blues Bros. could form aioint venture O E. Guys could engage in cheap talk. Don't invest Guys Invest Don't invest Invest