Case Study $8\mathrm{.}3$ The PATCO StrikePATCO was established in $1968$ as a professional society of federal air traffic controllers. Relations with the controllers employer, the Federal Aviation Administration $($FAA$),$ were stormy. Within $2$ years, PATCO had staged a sick$-$out and the FAA had responded by canceling the organization's dues checkoff system. A report commissioned by the U$.$S$.$ Department of Transportation $($DOT$)$ categorized PATCOFAA labormanagement relations as the worst in the federal sector.On March $25,1970,$ PATCO called its first nationwide job actiona sick$-$out that lasted $3$ weeksover FAA transfer of four PATCO members who were engaged in organizing efforts in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. It was a serious mistake, resulting in a union membership decline from more than $7500$ to less than $3000$ and near bankruptcy from a $$100$ million damage suit brought by the airlines. As part of the settlement, PATCO agreed to a permanent no$-$strike injunction. PATCO spent the next $3$ years seeking reinstatement of hundreds of controllers who were fired and suspended from duty by the FAA. Meanwhile, the FAA unsuccessfully fought PATCO's petition for certification as exclusive representative of the controllers. In $1973,$ the first contract negotiations were held. Throughout the remainder of the $1970$s$,$ PATCO and the FAA negotiated a series of $1-$year contracts, almost always in an atmosphere of crisis and work slowdowns.Accumulating bitterness from hostile contract negotiations and waves of grievances filed under the various written agreements came to a head as the last contract expired in March $1981$ and negotiations over a new contract reached an impasse. The dispute involved PATCO's demands concerning salaries, work hours, retirement programs, and other benefits that, to be granted, would require special treatment of the controllers somewhat similar to that accorded postal workers. PATCO President Robert Poli polled his membership on whether to go out on strike. Seventy$-$five percent voted for a walkout, and when Poli submitted the FAA's last best offer to the rank and file, they rejected the package by a $20-$to$-1$ margin.After $2$ subsequent months of negotiation and federal mediation, the two sides were, in mediator Kenneth Moffett's words, still miles apart. PATCO was asking for $$575$ million in new salaries and benefits, while the FAA said it would agree to $$40$ million and no more. On August $3,1981,12,000$ controllers refused to report to their control towers at airports throughout the United States.If the controllers thought President Ronald Reagan, a former head of the Screen Actors Guild $($and whom PATCO had endorsed for president$),$ would be sympathetic to their cause, they were sadly and fatally mistaken. Reagan labeled them lawbreakers, sought the imprisonment of strike leaders, and summarily dismissed from federal service all the strikers who refused to return to work within $48$ hours. A federal judge supported the president by imposing accelerating fines on the union that would total $$1$ million per day.If PATCO leaders were counting on public sympathy for the controllers to help encourage the FAA and the Reagan administration to compromise or back down, they were wrong again. The average citizeneven the typical union memberfound it difficult to identify with the relatively well$-$paid controllers who were demanding a maximum salary of $$59,000($about $$150,000$ in $2013$ dollars$),$ almost unequaled retirement benefits, and a $32-$hour workweek. Moreover, the strikers were clearly in violation of several federal laws and their oath of office. When Reagan and DOT Secretary Drew Lewis declared the strike over $($because all strikers had been fired$)$ and the DOT began hiring new controllers, there was little public outcry. There was, however, concern by air travelers that the nation's air traffic control system would be unable to function safely, amid predictions by the airline industry of massive layoffs and flight cancellations.Meanwhile, as new recruits began fast$-$track training to become air traffic controllers, some $2500$ supervisors were joined in directing aircraft by about $800$ military controllers, the $5000$ civilian controllers who had stayed on the job or returned within the amnesty period, and hundreds of recently retired controllers. Despite PATCO predictions of terrible air disasters and a crippled industry, neither happened. Commercial flights continued, although at reduced levels, and accidents occurred at or below normal levels. The airlines lost a great deal of money, but they never wavered in supporting the president.Three months later, PATCO was officially decertified as a bargaining representative by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Subsequent court appeals by the union were fruitless. The once proud and aggressive organization of professional air traffic controllers had been destroyed by its own strategic mistakes and a hostile administration.In hindsight, the strategic errors of PATCO are obvious. First, the union badly misread public reaction to the strike and to its demands. Little sympathy was offered to the highly paid white$-$collar workers during a period of citizen resistance to government taxation and spending. Second, the union failed to publicize legitimate grievances, including congested airways, tremendous mental strain on overworked controllers, and the need for improvements in technology. Third, PATCO did not anticipate the strong Reagan administration reaction to the strike and the government's determination to stick to its guns. Finally, PATCO did not make the time or effort to garner the support of other federal and private sector unions before the strike. Although controllers in Canada and Portugal did refuse to route U$.$S$.$ flights over their air space for several days, the actions were short$-$lived and not very troublesome. Organized labor in the United States abandoned the striking controllers and refused to respect their picket lines. Had domestic union support been stronger, the airline industry could have been brought to the brink of financial disaster, which would have tremendously increased settlement pressure on the administration.Years later, in $1987,$ air traffic controllers voted in a new union: the National Air Traffic Controllers Association $($NATCA$),$ organized by John Thornton, one of the controllers sacked by Mr$.$ Reagan. The new union adopted a no$-$strike pledge and disavowed illegal job actions, while renewing many of its earlier complaints concerning heavy workloads and an autocratic FAA. In $1989,$ NATCA successfully $($and peacefully$)$ negotiated its first contract. In $1993,$ President Clinton lifted the ban on rehiring the controllers fired by Reagan. Sadly, most were past retirement age or had moved on to other careers.Question Why do you think President Reagan reacted so strongly to the air traffic controller strike? How might subsequent presidents $($e$.$g$.,$ George W$.$ Bush and Barack Obama$)$ have handled the events differently?