Question: Consider a 2-player game described by the matrix below: For which range of x does a dominant strategy equilibrium exist? Is it a Nash Equilibrium?
Consider a 2-player game described by the matrix below:
For which range of x does a dominant strategy equilibrium exist? Is it a Nash Equilibrium? Is the Nash Equilibrium unique for this x?
Characterize the set of Nash Equilibria for all other relevant ranges of x.
| C | D | |
| C | x , 4 | 0 , 5 |
| D | 5 , 0 | 1 , 2 |
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