Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: $P=200-2Q_1-2Q_2.$ The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by $M{C}_1(Q_i)=4Qi.$ Based on this information, firm $1$ and $2\text{'}$s reaction functions are

A$)r_1(Q_2)=49-0\mathrm{.}5Q_2$ and $r_2(Q_1)=49-0\mathrm{.}5Q_1.$

B$)r_1(Q_2)=98-0\mathrm{.}5Q_2$ and $r_2(Q_1)=98-0\mathrm{.}5Q_1.$

C$)r_1(Q_2)=98-0\mathrm{.}25Q_2$ and $r_2(Q_1)=98-0\mathrm{.}25Q_1.$

D$)r_1(Q_2)=49-0\mathrm{.}5Q_1$ and $r_2(Q_1)=49-0\mathrm{.}5Q_2.$

Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the following inverse demand function: $P=400-2Q_1-2Q_2.$ The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by $MC=4.$ Based on this information, the Stackelberg follower's reaction function is

A$)Q_2=99-0\mathrm{.}5Q_1.$

B$)Q_2=198-0\mathrm{.}5Q_2.$

C$)Q_2=99-0\mathrm{.}5Q_2.$

D$)Q_2=198-0\mathrm{.}5Q_1.$