Consider a game in which Player 1 first selects between L and R. If Player 1 selects L, then players 1 and 2 play a Hawk-Dove game represented in the strategic form below. If Player 1 selects R then, Player 1 and 2 play a Prisoners' Dilemma game in which they simultaneously and independently choose between C and D. If they both choose C, then the payoff vector is (5,5). If they both choose D, then the payoff vector is (1,1). Finally, if one chooses C while the other chooses D whoever chooses C gets 0 and whoever chooses D gets 10. Respond to the questions below. a) Represent the game in extensive form (game tree). b) Write down the strategy sets of each player. c) Represent the game in strategic form (matrix). d) Find all the pure strategy Nash equilibrium profiles. e) Find all the sugbame perfect Nash equilibrium profiles in pure strategies