Consider a market with 4 agents a,...,d and 4 houses 1,...,4. The preference orders of agents...

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Consider a market with 4 agents a,...,d and 4 houses 1,...,4. The preference orders of agents over the houses are given by a: 1>2>3>4 b:1>2>3>4 c:1>2>3>4 d:4>3>2>1 How many Pareto efficient assignments are in this market? (Hint: You can use the fact that any Pareto efficient assignment M can be generated by a serial dictatorship mechanism. That is, there is an ordering of agents such that when agents choose in that order, the outcome of serial dictatorship is the assignment M. You don't need to prove this fact; you can use it if you want) Consider a market with 4 agents a,...,d and 4 houses 1,...,4. The preference orders of agents over the houses are given by a: 1>2>3>4 b:1>2>3>4 c:1>2>3>4 d:4>3>2>1 How many Pareto efficient assignments are in this market? (Hint: You can use the fact that any Pareto efficient assignment M can be generated by a serial dictatorship mechanism. That is, there is an ordering of agents such that when agents choose in that order, the outcome of serial dictatorship is the assignment M. You don't need to prove this fact; you can use it if you want)

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To find the number of Pareto efficient assignments in this market we can first analyze the possible ... View the full answer