Question: Consider a second price auction for a single item with two bidders. Suppose bidder 1 has a value uniformly drawn in the interval from 0

Consider a second price auction for a single item with two bidders. Suppose bidder 1 has a value uniformly drawn in the interval from 0 to 1, while bidder 2 has a value 0.4.

In the Bayesian equilibrium in undominated strategies, what is the seller's expected revenue? Give your answer to two decimal places.

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