Question: Consider a second price sealed bid auction for a single indivisible good with two bidders, where each bidder's valuation for the good is uniformly distributed
Consider a second price sealed bid auction for a single indivisible good with two bidders, where each bidder's valuation for the good is uniformly distributed on [0,1] and bidders only know their own valuation. Suppose the seller's valuation for the good is zero. Which of the following statements are true, which are false?
| If each buyer bids his valuation for the good, then there are no unexploited gains from trade after the auction. (2%) | True/false | |
|---|---|---|
| There is an equilibrium in which one buyer bids 0 regardless of his valuation and the other buyer bids 1 regardless of his valuations. (2%) | True/false | |
| If a bidder increases his/her bid, s/he increases both: the chance to obtain the good and the price s/he must pay conditional on winning the auction. (2%) | True/false |
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