Consider a standard stag hunt with two players, H S H 2,2 2,0 S 0,2 5,5...

 

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Consider a standard stag hunt with two players, H S H 2,2 2,0 S 0,2 5,5 2.a Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game. 2.b Are there mixed-strategy Nash equilibria? If so, are they efficient? 2.c Suppose that agents feel guilt a > 0 and envy 3 0, so that player i's utility from action profile a is u (a) = (a) - ( (a) - T (a)) - ( (a) (a)) . + Does the presence of guilt and envy affect the Nash equilibria you found in part (a)? 1 Now suppose that the column player is vegan. To support this, we introduce a new move V (for "veg- etables") for both players, H S V 2,0 2,1 H2,-1 S 0,-1 5,-2 0,1 V 1,-1 1,0 1,1 2.d Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the adjusted game. 2.e How does the addition of guilt and envy (as in part (c)) affect your answer to part (d)? If you find that guilt and envy have an impact, do you find that the necessary parameter values are reasonable? Why or why not? Consider a standard stag hunt with two players, H S H 2,2 2,0 S 0,2 5,5 2.a Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game. 2.b Are there mixed-strategy Nash equilibria? If so, are they efficient? 2.c Suppose that agents feel guilt a > 0 and envy 3 0, so that player i's utility from action profile a is u (a) = (a) - ( (a) - T (a)) - ( (a) (a)) . + Does the presence of guilt and envy affect the Nash equilibria you found in part (a)? 1 Now suppose that the column player is vegan. To support this, we introduce a new move V (for "veg- etables") for both players, H S V 2,0 2,1 H2,-1 S 0,-1 5,-2 0,1 V 1,-1 1,0 1,1 2.d Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the adjusted game. 2.e How does the addition of guilt and envy (as in part (c)) affect your answer to part (d)? If you find that guilt and envy have an impact, do you find that the necessary parameter values are reasonable? Why or why not?