Consider an Augmented Hawk Dove Bourgeois game, where Doves (and Bourgeois when acting like Doves) pay a small cost of k for negotiating, when they agree to share the prize with another Dove.

Moreover, 20=c, 8=v, and 4=k.

The payoff matrix for this Augmented Hawk Dove Bourgeois game is given below:

a) Is Bourgeois Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS)? If so, explain why.

b) Is Hawk Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS)? If so, explain why.

c) Suppose a yacht with a few Hawk types washed up on the shores of an Island whose (large) population was entirely Bourgeois. Can Hawk types invade the Island?

	Hawk	Dove	Bourgeois
Hawk	(v-c)/2, (v-c)/2	v, 0	v/2 + (v-c)/4, (v-c)/4
Dove	0, v	(v-k)/2, (v-k)/2	(v-k)/4, v/2 + (v-k)/4
Bourgeois	(v-c)/4, v/2 + (v-c)/4	v/2 + (v-k)/4, (v-k)/4	(v-k)/2, (v-k)/2