Question: Consider the following adverse selection problem. There are a large numbers of entrepreneurs each endowed with a project. Projects can be of two types: high
Consider the following adverse selection problem. There are a large numbers of entrepreneurs each endowed with a project. Projects can be of two types: high or low value. High value projects are worth H greater than 0 to external investors and Q, with 0 less than Q less than H, to the entrepreneur. Low quality projects are worth L, with 0 less than L less than H to investors and zero to the entrepreneur. Let p denote the share
| Entrepreneurs endowed with low value projects make (weakly) higher profits by selling on the market than those endowed with high value projects. |
| If , then high quality projects are not traded on the market |
| Low quality projects are always traded when high quality projects are traded, but the reverse is not necessarily true. |
| Low quality projects are only traded if high quality projects are also traded |
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