Consider the following dynamic Bayesian game. There is a firm and a worker. Nature chooses the type of the firm (player 1): with probability p the firm is of high quality (High - it provides flexible working hours, remote working, very collegial and supportive working environment) and with probability 1-p the firm is of low quality (Low - rigid working hours on site, very unhappy working environment with a lot of turnover). The worker does not observe the quality of the firm. The firm chooses either to offer a job to the worker (Offer) or not to offer a job (No Offer). If no job is offered, the game ends and both parties receive a 0. If the firm offers a job, then the worker either accepts (A) or rejects (R) the offer. The worker's effort on the job brings the firm a profit of 2. If the worker rejects an offer of employment, then the firm gets a payoff of -1. Rejecting an offer yields a payoff of 0 to the worker. Accepting an offer yields the worker a payoff of 2 if the firm is of high quality and -1 if the firm is of low quality. The game tree below represents the game situation just described. Assume that ? = ?/ ?

High Low Nature p=1/4 1-p=3/4 Firm Firm No Offer Offer Offer No Offer q 1-q Worker Worker o o oo A R A R N N