Consider the following one$-$shot simultaneous$-$move game: L C R U $($;$0)(0$;$4)(0$;$5)$ M $(2$;$0)(1$;$1)(0$;$0)$ D $(0$;$0)(0$;$0)(3$;$3)$ a$)$ Give all Nash equilibria in pure strategies. For parts b and c below, the game is played twice, with both players observing the outcome of the first period$$s play before playing the second period with common discount factor $=1.$ For both parts, consider only pure strategies. b$)$ Give a subgame$-$perfect Nash equilibrium in which $($U$,$ C$)$ is played in the first period. c$)$ For what values of does there exist a SP NE in which $($M$,$ L$)$ is played in the first period? Give the SPNE.