Consider the following perfect information sequential move game between Player 1 and Player 2, where x is an integer. Player 1 is the leader and moves first, while Player 2 is the follower and moves second, after observing Player 1's move. 0 i. Illustrate the rollback process and find the equilibrium path for every possible value of x. What are the payoffs to each player at the quilibrium outcome? li. Describe the full set of available strategies available to each Player. Choose one of the strategies for each Player and describe what it means. Describe the rollback equilibrium by providing and using the complete strategies employed by each Player for every possible value of x. 25 toy BO 2 4 NX Consider the following perfect information sequential move game between Player 1 and Player 2, where x is an integer. Player 1 is the leader and moves first, while Player 2 is the follower and moves second, after observing Player 1's move. 0 i. Illustrate the rollback process and find the equilibrium path for every possible value of x. What are the payoffs to each player at the quilibrium outcome? li. Describe the full set of available strategies available to each Player. Choose one of the strategies for each Player and describe what it means. Describe the rollback equilibrium by providing and using the complete strategies employed by each Player for every possible value of x. 25 toy BO 2 4 NX