Consider the model from Section 10.3. But suppose the voter has an affinity for the incumbent, so that if the incumbent is reelected, the voter gets an additional payoff of. (This could be because the incumbent is charismatic, because the voter and incumbent are from the same political party or ethnicity, etc.) From the analysis in footnote 2, if the voter believes that low ability incumbents choose efforte;, then, conditional on seeing a good outcome, the voter believes the incumbent is of high ability with probability p+ef1 p = p. If the voter observes the bad outcome, he is certain the incumbent is low ability. (a) What is the expected utility of electing the challenger? (b) If the voter believes low ability incumbents choose effont;, what is the expected utility of reelecting the incumbent after seeing a good outcome? (c) What is the expected utility of reelecting the incumbent after seeing a bad outcome? (d) If the voter believes low ability incumbents choose effor;, for what values of does the voter reelect the incumbent no matter what? For what values of does the voter reelect the incumbent only following a good outcome? (e) If% is such that the voter reelects the incumbent no matter what, what will the incumbent choose? (f) What does this imply about the effect of voter affinities for one candidate over the other on electoral accountability? (g) We can think of higher levels of voter affinity as corresponding to less competitive elections. Does this model suggest that competitive elections are good or had for accountabhilitv