Question: Consider the repeated interaction Bertrand model presented in class with 2 firms. Explain why a collusive agreement is not stable if firms only commit to

Consider the repeated interaction Bertrand model presented in class with 2 firms. Explain why a collusive agreement is not stable if firms only commit to punish a deviating firm for one period (i.e. after a deviation, both firms revert to the one-period Nash equilibrium for one period, but then in the following period return to the collusive price). How would your answer change if there were 3 firms?

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