Consider the thrice-repeated restaurant pricing prisoners' dilemma we studied in Section 3.B, but now suppose that there
Question:
Consider the thrice-repeated restaurant pricing prisoners' dilemma we studied in Section 3.B, but now suppose that there are three phenotypes in the population: A, which always defects; T, which plays tit-for-tat; and type S, which never defects on the first play but always defects on the second play of each round of two successive plays against the same opponent.
A) Draw the three-by-three fitness table for the game, similar to the fitness table that we provided in Exercise S3.
For each of parts (b)-(d), be specific and explicit in your answers; make sure you use payoff numbers from the fitness table you draw to answer part (a).
B) Can a population that is 100% type A be successfully invaded by type S mutants?
C) Can a population that is 100% type T be successfully invaded by type S mutants?
D) Is the newly conceived type S strategy an ESS of this game?
Microeconomics An Intuitive Approach with Calculus
ISBN: 978-0538453257
1st edition
Authors: Thomas Nechyba