Exercise 1. [3 points] Airbus and Boeing - A and B hereafter - are two major players in the market for aircrafts. A is deciding whether to enter a new market. If A stays Out, A receives 0 and B bags $100 million in profit. If A enters, i.e., if A stays In, B can either start a Price war or Accommodate. If B chooses Accommodate, each receives $30 million. Else, if B chooses Price war, each loses $10 million (i.e., think of this as -10). (i) Write down the extensive-form game. [Note: It is sufficient to draw just a game tree specifying players' names at the decision nodes, choices in the branches, and payoffs at the terminal nodes] (ii) Write down the set of pure strategies available to each player. (iii) Solve the game using backward induction. (iv) Now consider the normal-form game where payoffs are as stated above but A and B are moving simultaneously. Draw the payoff matrix with A being the row player and B is the column player] (v) State all the Nash equilibria in pure strategies. (vi) Are all Nash equilibria in (iv) admissible