For the extensive form game described below: $($a$)$ N $=\{1,2\}($b$)$ H consists of $,($A$),($B$),($A$,$ R$),($A$,$ L$)($c$)$ P$()=1$ and P$($A$)=2($d$)($A$,$ R$)1($B$)1($A$,$ L$)($B$)2($A$,$ R$)2($A$,$ L$)$ Represent the game in extensive form $$ Solve the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game using backward induction $$ Represent the game in normal form $$ Solve for the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria of the game. Determine whether the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria of the game are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Explain your answers. Clearly and precisely