Hi! The question below has multiple steps, but I am struggling to understand it, I would really appreciate and help thank you!

1 -

In lecture we saw the Cournot competition model for two firms with the same cost function. Now, we are going to consider asymmetric cost functions. Assume that demand for a good is given by=^ (^is quantity demanded), and that there are2 firms competing in quantities. Both have no fixed costs and a constant marginal cost. Firm 1 has a marginal cost1, and firm 2 has a marginal cost2. We have that>1>2.

Find the reaction functions of firms 1 and 2 in this market: how the optimal quantity produced depends on the quantity produced by the other firm.

To verify that you have found the correct reaction functions, compute the optimal1if2=100,=4,=0.01,1=2, and2=1. (Note that this is not necessarily an equilibrium.)

1=

2 - Solve for the quantity produced by each firm and the equilibrium price.

To verify that you have found the correct equilibrium, compute1,2, andif=4,=0.01,1=2, and2=1.

1=

2=

=

Thank you!!